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Abstract: 
In this paper we will focus on the analysis of the company Zinkia Entertainment S.A. 
The company, which become well-known from 2007 to mid-2009, undertakes a journey 
in search of financing for its projects, both present and future. We will detail the 
movements made by the company, and through the study of its annual accounts we 
will analyze the company since mid-2009 up to now. In order to do this, we will use 
various financial ratios, which will allow us to analyze the accounts of the company and 
truly understand its situation and problems at all times. As a result, we will be able to 
draw some conclusions about the results of the company, and we will reflect on the role 
and influence organizations such as the Alternative Investment Market or the CNMV 
have. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the critical aspects for the good progress of companies with growth potential 
and which are in their expansion phase is the ability to find funding sources. These 
companies usually have interesting products, with a already existing business model, 
although they need to obtain more external resources in order to explode and become 
larger companies. There comes a time when the contribution of the partners who run 
the company or the potential benefits the company has obtained in previous years are 
not enough to enable the company to take the next step in its natural path. In order to 
get this financing, the companies have several options in the world today, each with its 
pros and cons, which the companies themselves should take into account. In addition, 
it is especially important evolution in terms of results of the exercises the company 
develops. These results can mark out, of course, the path of society and its funding 
needs in coming years. 
This situation is what we see in the company we will talk about in this document, Zinkia 
Entertainment S.A. A company with a thriving product in its field, which is beginning to 
gain international recognition and which needs an extra push to liberate all the potential 
of a newborn trend. We will see which decisions the company administration takes, 
how the company walked the first steps in the search for funding and what different 
path the company chose at any given time. We will reflect on why the company 
decided to carry out a change of strategy and we will think about the consequences 
those decisions will have in the coming years. We will also discuss the situation of the 
company before and after the decisions taken, and what is the company situation when 
the results turn out not to be the expected ones. 
In this process for raising finance, external entities were involved, and we should also 
focus on them briefly. So, we will describe what additional options Zinkia has as a part 
of a stock market as the AIM. Also, we will detail which differences exist between this 
market and other better known markets, and if these differences may have been 
meaningful when explaining the situation the company undergoes nowadays. In 
addition, we will see what happens when a body such as the CNMV gives a negative 
judgment when a company in a difficult situation, as Zinkia, tries to capture funding. On 
the other hand, the importance of shareholder stability within a company trying to 
expand should also be remarked. This does not happen in Zinkia, and we shall 
describe briefly the struggle for power, which is still in force in society; a struggle, 
compounded by the decisions of a president who makes decisions with the sole 
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support of majority shareholder, against the opinion of other important at a particularly 
delicate moment in the life of Zinkia. 
In order to analyze the path of Zinkia, we will structure information as follows. First, we 
will briefly describe the objectives of this document and the methodology to be 
followed. Then, we will divide the path of Zinkia into three sections. In the first section, 
we will narrate the situation of the company since 2008 until the end of 2010. It is at 
this time, at the end of 2010, when Zinkia changes course regarding its funding 
strategy. After this first block, we will analyze the situation of the company since late 
2010 until the end of 2013. At this moment, the most critical time for the company 
occurs, which marks its evolution to the present. A failed attempt to get more funding 
requires the company to enter a pre-arrangement with creditors. In the third section, we 
will describe the situation of Zinkia since the pre-arrangement with creditors until today. 
Although we only have the annual accounts until 2014, we will see how the 
arrangement with creditors ends and what is the situation of the company today. 
Finally, we will dedicate a section to analyze the AIM, describe some of its differences 
concerning regulated markets and reflect on how these differences can foster cases 
like Zinkia’s. 
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2. Objectives and methodology 
 
The main objective of this work is to tell the story of Zinkia Entertainment S.A since 
2008, when it begins to grow thanks to its brand Pocoyó, until today. We will mainly 
focus on the road that the company follows in its search for financing in order to try to 
solve its problems in the short term, and we will analyze the company results in the 
various financial years. To analyze these results, we will make use of various financial 
ratios. These tools provide us with evidence on the evolution of the company over the 
years. Also, we will relate the shareholder structure of the company, which has the 
instability and infighting as its most important features. Without trying to give an 
absolute answer, we will raise the data in order to help the reader be more familiar with 
the company and its figures. In addition, we will take a look on the Alternative 
Investment Market, with the aim of highlighting some of its features when reflecting on 
its role or responsibility in Zinkia’s case. 
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3. From the beginning until the firsts Pocoyó bonds 
 
Zinkia Entertainment S.A. (hereinafter Zinkia) is a Spanish company founded in 2001, 
which bases its activity on creating content of children's entertainment. The aim of 
Zinkia is to convert this content into universal entertainment brands. 
In order to know how Zinkia set, we must go back to 2000, moment when two of Zinkia 
future partners, David Cantolla and Colman López founded a company called Junk & 
Beliavsky (Panorama audiovisual.com 2009). Subsequently, they incorporated 
Jomaca, which was owned 80 % by José María Castillejo. Junk & Beliavsky then 
became the company this study is about: Zinkia Entertainment; first as a limited 
company and then as a corporation. 
Zinkia becomes more important in the Spanish panorama from the year 2006, year in 
which his animated series Pocoyó, created the previous year, begins to accumulate 
under his belt many industry awards, both nationally and internationally. These 
included an award at the I Festival of Annecy (the “Oscar of animation”) and the Bafta 
prize, awarded by the British Academy. 
3.1 Negative results and the AIM 
 
Despite the strength the company got thanks to Pocoyó, Zinkia problems were not long 
in coming. The shareholder struggle and some disagreements between the partners 
have been, and remain, commonplace in the company. And these disagreements are 
expressed, for the first time in late 2007 and during 2008. During these months, both 
David Cantolla and Colman López, founding partners of Zinkia, sell to José Maria 
Castillejo and some people he trusted their holdings, thus demonstrating that they were 
breaking up with the majority shareholder and president of the organization. However, 
problems in Zinkia had only just begun. 2008 was the first year from which financial 
data are taken, and it marks the beginning of the first block of analysis of the situation 
of the company, which will take us until 2010. 
It is already in 2008 when negative results show up. Despite the relevance of the 
company, which acquires Pocoyó internationally, this does not translate into good 
figures for the company. The income statement details a loss of almost 800,000 euros 
during the year under consideration, so Zinkia started looking for ways to finance its 
new projects and business activity with Pocoyó. In order to do this, the company made 
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the decision, in mid-2009, of using the stock market for funding. Specifically, Zinkia 
finds its place in the Alternative Investment Market (hereinafter AIM). 
The AIM is a stock market oriented to small cap companies looking to expand, with 
tailored regulations, according to what its own website says today (MaB 2016). That is, 
it is a program to help smaller businesses access the Stock market. However, in 2009, 
Zinkia became the first SME in this market, which was born in 2005. In addition it 
reactivated company debuts in this market, since from July 2008, none were produced. 
The financial crisis which came in 2008 literally wiped this stock market. 
So Zinkia intended to achieve a dual purpose with its entry into the AIM: to be financed 
through the stock market and to have, in the future, the ability to issue debt. This 
second case is possible because the CNMV regulates the AIM, and it gives, a priori, 
visibility and extra notoriety when trying to raise finance by issuing bonds. However, the 
appearance on the market, which became effective on July 15, was not easy. 
The price for the Zinkia’s stock debut was established in 1.92€ per share, below the 
indicative range of between 2.65€ and 4.09€ —which was initially fixed for the 
operation—, and what meant that the company was valued at between 55.09 and 
85.03 million euros. Instead, with the price of 1.92€ per share, Zinkia was valued at 40 
million euros. This new price had immediate effects on the market debut, since the 
initial public offering was suspended, affecting 3.66 million shares, which were held by 
members of the audiovisual producer. The operation was, therefore, limited to the 
capital increase, worth 7 million euros, equivalent to 3.66 million shares (Cotizalia 
2009). 
Despite the initial euphoria, the price on the opening day shot up to 2.45€ and Zinkia 
suffered a gradual decline in its price during the years 2009 and 2010 caused by the 
unstoppable decline in its income statement. The share price was below 1 euro per 
share, while all the economic indicators were relating the decline of the company. 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
3.2 Financial Analysis of the period 2008-2010 
 
Table 1 
  2010 2009 2008 
Shareholders 
equity 
9.501.287,00 € 54 % 11.843.891,00 € 66 % 6.920.575,17 € 45 % 
Share 
premium 
9.570.913,00 € 54 % 9.570.913,00 € 53 % 2.896.485,30 € 19 % 
Profit before 
tax 
-3.046.695,00 € 
 
- 1.795.182,00 € 
 
-789.007,98 € 
 
 
Seeking funding for new projects was the guide that set the course of Zinkia during its 
lifetime. In this period, from 2008 to 2010, we can see that the first attempt failed. The 
company, as we have already mentioned, chose to first seek financing through equity, 
with the entry into the stock market. The sales on the market of more than 3 million 
shares, worth 7 million euros, had immediate effects on the financial structure of the 
audiovisual producer. As we can see in the table, the premium rose from nearly 3 
million in 2008 to 9.5 million in 2009, which resulted from the trading operation carried 
out. It was a value that had no major importance due to the failed attempt the IPO 
made to launch the property; a value that would have increased by another 7 million 
euros if this IPO would come to fruition. 
Equity in 2009 was about to reach 12 million euros, representing an increase of 70 % 
over the net assets of the previous year. At the same time, this figure was the largest 
relative weight of equity over liabilities in Zinkia’s history, exceeding 65 %; a relative 
weight which started to fall due to losses in the income statement of Zinkia and the 
increased debt from the year 2011, as we will point out later. From this data, we can 
make a clear reflection: Zinkia exhausted during these years all its capacity to finance 
through capital inflows through equity. The failed attempt made by the IPO showed 
some doubts about the ability of the audiovisual producer to find enough funding to 
develop its business model. This first setback was accompanied by the sharp decline in 
the value of the share price of the company, which lost momentum as the months 
passed. These two events forced Zinkia to explore new avenues to continue funding its 
activity in a different way than they had done so far. 
Moreover, as we can see in the table, the results of the company deteriorated 
considerably. The result in 2010 tripled, negatively, the result obtained at the beginning 
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of the period. Zinkia was, by then, incapable of transforming the input of funding into 
tangible results. The amount of the turnover, which in this period did not exceed 4 
million euros, quickly diluted between staff costs and other operating expenses. This 
greatly aggravated the situation for the audiovisual producer, which in two years had 
exhausted its capacity to finance itself without having to resort to encumbrance and, on 
the other hand, was unable to be financed thanks to its own results. 
To further analyze the situation of Zinkia in this three years period, we can use two of 
the indexes most used today to analyze companies, the ROA and ROE indicators. 
Table 2 
  2010 2009 2008 
ROA -15,7 % -7,8 % -2,8 % 
ROE -32,2 % -15,2 % -11,5 % 
 
ROA measures the profit achieved by the company in a given period in relation to the 
total assets of the company. This way, we can measure the efficiency of these assets, 
regardless of how they were financed and what was the tax burden in the country. That 
is, the ability of company assets to generate income for themselves. ROA is calculated 
as follows: 
ROA = Earnings before interest and taxes / Total assets. 
 
We have already seen the negative trend that the benefit of the company accumulates 
throughout this period. Although the financial result sinks even further the company 
profit, the greater weight resides in the operating result, which, as it is negative, already 
indicates which sign the ROA will have. This indicates that the assets of the company 
are unable to generate a positive result. Therefore, analyzing what are the main items 
comprising Zinkia actives becomes interesting and very revealing. 
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Table 3 
  2010 2009 2008 
Intangible 
assets 
8.664.851 49 % 8.748.627 49 % 8.277.424 54  % 
Deferred 
tax assets 
3.929.006 22 % 3.167.605 18 % 2.453.474 16 % 
Commercial 
debts and 
others bills 
to be paid 
3.702.132 21 % 3.377.503 19 % 2.969.964 19 % 
 
The three main items comprising the assets are intangible assets, deferred tax assets 
and trade receivables and other receivables. As we can see in the table, the three 
items keep, some points up or down, its relative weight regarding the total assets of the 
company. The three of them have, in the period 2008-2010, almost 90 % of the assets 
of the company. However, if we look at one to one these three, we can see why the set 
of assets of Zinkia shows problems when trying to get a better turnover. 
The only item from what Zinkia can earn income is the intangible assets item. All 
brands and audiovisual products by Zinkia, including Pocoyó, are encompassed under 
this heading. The relative weight of it is 50 %, however, the reality is that the producer 
based 100 % of its business on the registered brands and products included within this 
intangible asset. The second most important item in 2010 was deferred tax assets, an 
item that, following the negative results of the company, continued its particular rise in 
amount and importance within the set of company assets. However, these assets did 
not help reverse the negative situation of the company, and were only able to help in 
the future if results were positive, what finally did not happen. The third most important 
assets are trade accounts payable and receivables: a further problem to add to the 
situation of Zinkia, because every year receivable debts increased, which meant that 
the company failed to reduce the average time of payment from customers, something 
that can also affect the financing of certain new projects. 
Once the economic profitability of Zinkia in this period has been taken into account, we 
can briefly analyze the financial profitability of the company. To do this, we will use a 
second index: the ROE. ROE measures the returns earned by shareholders from the 
funds invested in the company; ie, the ability of the company to pay its shareholders. 
The formula is: 
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ROE = Net profit after tax / Capital sources 
We understand the difference between capital and assets and current liabilities, ie, 
equity. We have previously analyzed the changes in equity during the period. A 70 % 
increase in 2009 over the previous year, due to the capital increase to debut into the 
AIM. However, the negative results of this period gradually diminished the net of the 
company. Meanwhile, net profit of Zinkia kept on having, throughout the years, a 
negative sign, with losses reaching 3 million by 2010. Hence the negative sign of ROE 
is clear: the audiovisual producer was unable to pay its shareholders, and even 
required them a greater contribution to finance its activities. Knowing that this was not 
possible, and that this pathway was exhausted, the company took the way of bond 
issues and financing through liabilities. 
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4. Looking for resources: Pocoyó Bonds 
 
After seeing that the results of 2009 and the first three quarters were not the expected 
ones, that the financing on the capital increase in 2009 was not enough and that the 
net funding channel was exhausted, Zinkia decided, at the end of October 2010, to 
launch its first bond issue. The company sought to achieve, through the “Pocoyó 
bonds”, 11 million euros to finance its production. The bonds had a yield of 9.75 %, with 
an annual coupon and a maturity of three years’ time, so Zinkia became the first SME 
which emitted public debt. The risks Zinkia involved were clear, with a series of 
negative results accumulated in the last three years. Hence high yield offered for these 
bonds, which were intended for any investor, with a minimum of one thousand euros. 
4.1 Analysing the results of the period 2011-2013 
 
With the entry of new resources, the situation of the society relatively improved over 
2011, because although it failed to end the tax year in positive figures, losses were 
substantially lower than those of 2010. While the year 2012 began with a record of 
employment regulation, which affected almost a third of the workforce of the entity, this 
was Zinkia’s best year by far throughout the historical series analyzed in this work. The 
difference consisted in the sales of the company in 2012. 
Table 4 
  2013 2012 2011 
Profit before 
tax 
-1.807.652 1.158.550 -693.544 
Net amount 
of the 
turnover 
5.290.982 8.239.438 4.520.767 
 
The net turnover in 2012 increased by more than 80 % over the previous year, which 
allowed Zinkia have a positive sign in its income statement. As reported by the 
audiovisual producer itself, this increase in sales was due to the international 
expansion of the commercial exploitation of the animated series Pocoyó. This 
commercial exploitation in some countries was held by outside companies, and in 2012 
the audiovisual producer recovered them, for respite from its accounts. 
However, things turned to twist in 2013, as Zinkia could not consolidate its 
improvement and again returned to the starting position of the year 2011. Sales grew to 
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resent very noticeably, despite the fact that personnel costs also fell by 1 million euros 
compared to 2012; the operating result was already slightly negative. Moreover, the 
consequences of the issuance of the bonds in 2010 must be added to it, financial 
expenses that nearly reached the −1.5 million euros in 2013, sinking the overall result 
of Zinkia. This increase in financial expenses during this period of three years reveals 
the growing importance of debts in Zinkia. 
4.2 The growing importance of liabilities in Zinkia 
 
A very clear way to visualize the growing importance of liabilities over the net is to use 
the data that gives us the ratio of net debt or debt ratio. This ratio is calculated very 
easily, with the following formula: 
Debt ratio = Total liabilities / Equity 
Graphic 1 
  
 
After the capital increase carried out in 2009, the debt meant little more than half the 
equity in the company. That is, Zinkia financed most of its activities with the 
contribution made by its partners and its shareholders. From this moment, and 
because of the financial problems we have already appointed, the company decided to 
finance its activity by debt, which leaded to a shift in the financial structure and in the 
ratio we are analyzing. The liability took importance over the years, and at the end of 
the period we are analyzing, in 2013, it accounted for 150 % of the equity of the 
company. 
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These data themselves need not necessarily be bad, because a company can fully 
finance by debt, without this being a serious problem or having excessive risk. What is 
theoretically established as “correct” when financing projects in the medium term is to 
try to structure debt mostly in the long run. This was what Zinkia made at the end of 
2010: issuing three-year debentures, which helped the company obtain benefits of their 
products already established in the market, especially Pocoyó, and bringing to the 
market new audiovisual entertainment brands for children. However, the objectives 
were not met, and despite the calm the company lived in 2012, in 2013 Zinkia was 
unable to break with its negative results trend. These negative results, along with the 
increase of debts to third parties, posed a problem for the company, as did not obtain 
sufficient resources to repay the money it had borrowed, plus the important interests 
with a return of 9 % the company had promised, over three years. 
While it is true that the primary responsibility for the change experimented by this ratio 
is the accumulated debt of Zinkia, both short and long term, we also have to take into 
account the behavior of the equity of the company. After reaching a peak in 2009, 
exceeding 11 million euros in equity —neither adjustments for changes in value nor 
grants, gifts or bequests are important in Zinkia—, equity did not cease to descend until 
2013, with the only exception of year 2012. So in 2013 equity did not even reach 9 
million euros, and its relative weight dropped to 39 %, while in 2009 the equity of the 
company was 65 % of the balance. The other side of the coin, which reflects how 
losses as the company over the years, are gradually consuming the resources of 
society. This situation is the one that tackles the audiovisual producer to seek 
resources outside, in an operation which, of course, leaded to a significant increase in 
company’s risk profile. As shown in the following table, debts took considerable 
importance in Zinkia. 
Table 5 
  2011 2012 2013 
Long-term debts 4.867.597 6.827.306 6.807.339 
Short-term debts 2.141.651 4.147.761 4.253.867 
Trade creditors and 
other payables 
1.551.434 2.993.628 2.527.583 
 
From the end of 2010, and definitely in 2011, debt was the protagonist of the company. 
The issuance of “Pocoyó bonds” mortgaged the future of the audiovisual producer. The 
attempt to seek funding leaves us the data we have above: first, long-term debt that in 
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2012 added up to 7 million euros. Its relative weight in the balance grows fifteen 
percentage points since 2009, reaching 30 % in 2013. As we have pointed out, it can 
be a good option to finance medium-term projects with medium-term passive. 
However, the problems come when the medium-term financing goes on to become 
debt just one year ahead. 
This is what happened in the last two years of this period. The short-term debt doubled 
in 2012, compared to the same debt in the previous year. The same applies to 
commercial debts. Zinkia weathered the storm in 2012, thanks to the good results of 
this exercise, and got more than one million euro profit. But in 2013 shortcomings came 
to light, and also at that time the audiovisual producer needed a new entry of liquid 
assets to meet its current liabilities. This carried a risk, because although Zinkia listed 
on the AIM, its ability to raise funds could not be likened to that of larger companies. 
The ratio of short-term debt, which is calculated by dividing current liabilities between 
the net assets of the company, is significant at this time. In the years 2012 and 2013, 
this ratio exceeds the always dangerous barrier of 50 %, reaching 80 % in 2013, what is 
a value that shows very clearly the level of risk that Zinkia had reached. It was easy to 
glimpse that the short-term debt would exceed the equity of the company. Besides, this 
debt did not come alone, but it was accompanied by a series of financial expenses 
such as interest obligations. The more issued debt, the greatest the interest —in this 
case annual coupons— that must be faced. As expected, these financial expenses 
reached its peak in 2013, after a period of steady rise. That year the interest payable 
rose almost to 1.5 million, while there was hardly any interest income that offset this 
value. 
4.2 Analysing Zinkia’s Assets 
 
On the other side of the balance sheet, assets, we cannot see in the balance of Zinkia 
a clear effect of the funding obtained by the company by the issuance of the “Pocoyó 
bonds”. The starting reference in the assets of Zinkia, intangible assets, maintained the 
same values as in 2008, and they even deteriorate slightly. With this data, we can 
understand that Zinkia was not able to increase the value of its brands over the years, 
neither to create new audiovisual products that had a strong impact on the company. 
With the increase in the total value of assets, which rose from 17 million in 2011 to 23 
million in 2013, the virtually only productive asset of the audiovisual producer lost its 
relative weight in the accounts and assumed about 35 % of total assets in 2012 and 
2013, compared with the 50 % inherent in previous years. 
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Among the items that assume that total increase in assets are the already named 
deferred tax assets, which overcome the barrier of 5 million euros and non-current 
trade payables. In this period, Zinkia aggravates their problems with time collection of 
sales. Commercial long-term debt, which was virtually zero in 2011, in 2013 slightly 
exceeded 4 million euros. The short-term commercial debt, however, reduced in this 
last year to half of its value in the historical series. This change in both games is an 
added problem for Zinkia, because what the company needed at that time were liquid 
resources to finance its projects and to cope with its growing long-term debt. 
Once this untenable situation in the short term is assessed, the leaders of Zinkia turn 
back to a bond issue, trying to obtain the necessary liquidity to continue its activity and, 
above all, to address its imminent demands. The three-year issue that was launched in 
late 2010 came to an end, and it was time for the company to repay the money it had 
borrowed its creditors. 
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5. From the bankruptcy proceedings till today 
 
5.1 Failure of Pocoyó Bonds 
 
Taking into account the emergency situation that arose in late 2013 and early 2014 and 
that much of the debt issued in 2010 was already due, Zinkia sought a way to find 
resources to meet its obligations. The solution of choice by the company was, again, a 
second issue of “Pocoyó bonds”. The characteristics of this second issuance were very 
similar to those of the first one: again, a maturity of three years and with annual 
coupons. The only difference was that the returns offered were even greater than the 
ones regarding the issue of 2010. If at that time offered Zinkia 9 %, in this case it came 
to 11 %. With this issue amounting to 7.78 million euros, the company aimed to 
address this short-term debt and to go on with its activity. 
However, this issue soon found a major setback. Although the CNMV gave its approval 
to the issue, at the same time the organization issued a statement while questioning 
the returns offered by the audiovisual producer. The agency then headed by Elvira 
Rodríguez stressed that Zinkia had a negative working capital of 3 million euros, 
warning that the company had not enough short-term liquidity to cope with its debts. 
The CNMV did not rule in its statement that taking into account the losses Zinkia 
accumulated until the issue, the audiovisual producer "could incur in some of the 
possible foreseen cases in the bankruptcy laws" (Expansión.com 2013). In addition, it 
finally added that the compensation Zinkia offered on this issue would be less than the 
one it should offer to register properly if it was directed at a wholesale market. The 
CNMV scampered and doubted of the favorable report that an independent expert, who 
had been commissioned by Zinkia the development of the appraisal report which is 
required in the case of issuances intended for the retail market, had conducted. 
This statement was a blow from which the company could no longer be lifted. The 
president of the producer, José María Castillejo, rejected any comparison with other 
known cases, such as Nueva Rumasa and Pescanova. Castillejo arguments were 
based on the transparency Zinkia shown compared with previous comparison. Zinkia 
had complied with the requirements imposed by the CNMV and had coped with its 
obligations so far. Furthermore, once cash tensions were recognized, the high growth 
potential of the business was defended, with a significantly higher sales forecast for the 
following years. However, all attempts to save the issuance were not enough. Days 
passed and the rate of placement of the issue was not moving, and less than twenty 
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days later the company was forced to withdraw due to the weak demand. At this very 
moment, the company welcomed the pre-bankruptcy. 
At this point, the enormous importance that the statement was carried out by the 
CNMV should be noted. A statement that marked negatively the future of Zinkia, and 
that was collected in all specialized media due to its exceptionality. Particularly striking 
was the headline of the newspaper Cinco Días, which headlined: "Pocoyó launches 
bonds to 11 % to avoid going bankrupt" (Fernando Sanz 2013) And it was a very 
special case, especially because the CNMV ruled against the report of an independent 
expert. We cannot judge negatively the statement released by the CNMV, as the 
situation of Zinkia seemed untenable. However, we do find the paradox that the 
regulator allows the issuance itself, knowing that it offers a lower profitability than 
appropriate and that the company is very likely to enter bankruptcy in a few days’ time. 
The organization intended to protect the investor with this negative assessment, 
although it still allowed the issuance. Because of that, the small investors may stumble 
on a product that, given the risk it entailed, could not be intended for them. The press 
reviews went both ways: some of them understood the statement published by the 
CNMV, while some others criticized how harsh the document was. 
5.2 Zinkia in Bankruptcy proceedings 
 
From this moment, while it was in pre-bankruptcy, the company sought the agreement 
with bondholders to delay payment of amortization of obligations, and this agreement 
was achieved in a short space of time. Although on 1st call the required quorum was 
not achieved, the result of the negotiations was positive, and on 2nd call they reached 
an agreement. It was agreed to delay for two more years, until the end of 2015, the 
payment of the redemption of the bonds. In return, the bondholders received in these 
two years coupons of 11 %, profitability higher than the original one of 9.75 %, and the 
company paid coupons immediately during 2013. However, not everything was solved: 
there was a loan with a bank totaling 2.5 million euros that could not be refinanced, so 
Zinkia had to apply for bankruptcy. This was approved by the Commercial Court in April 
2014. At this time, the audiovisual producer was delisted in the AIM. 
At that moment, new problems arose, such as a the struggle for Zinkia shareholder 
power. The company's president of the company, José María Castillejo, who owned 
Zinkia shares, Jomaca 98, had also declared bankruptcy. Still, Castillejo, continued to 
take decisions that the other shareholders did not support. One example was the 
approval with the votes of the president, and against the other shareholders’ opinion, of 
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the authorization to the board of directors to to launch a new bond issue. At the same 
time, minority shareholders, asked the authorities of the CNMV to control more closely 
the performance of Castillejo. Also at this time, the struggle for shareholder control of 
the audiovisual producer between Castillejo and the second largest shareholder in 
number of shares, Miguel Valladares, was initiated. The latter acquired a credit of 
Jomaca 98 to Bankia, in which, among other guarantees, appeared Castillejos’ 33 % 
stake in Zinkia. If this credit was carried out, Valladares would become the majority 
shareholder of the company, with 40 % of shares, to the detriment of Castillejo. 
Despite these internal tensions and bad results that occurred in 2014, the company 
managed to overcome the financial year. Zinkia creditors accepted the proposal of the 
company to refinance debt, delaying the repayment of debt for a period of 10 years for 
the privileged and ordinary debt, and of 20 years for subordinated debt; that is, 
delaying repayment until 2023 and 2033, respectively. In addition, a grace period of 
three years for coupons was approved, which would begin to be paid from 2017 on. 
This proposed ten-year refinancing, instead of the five-year one listed in the bankruptcy 
law, was accepted by the "international projection of the company's business, jobs that 
depend on it and the extent of the affected economic interests." Thus, in September 
2015, the company came out of bankruptcy, almost two years after the failed attempt of 
the second bond issue and at the same time the audiovisual producer began to make 
payments under the proposed agreement. Finally, Zinkia shares returned to trading on 
the AIM, and although in a few days they went from 0.48 euros to 1.40 euros per share, 
this was not a mirage, as the price went back fastly to values between 0.60 to 0.70 
euros per share. 
At this point, it is interesting to reflect on how the CNMV can control a company listed 
on a stock exchange as the AIM. Zinkia could issue public debt thanks to access to this 
market that aimed at all types of investors, since the minimum investment was set at 
just 1,000 euros. At the time, the company issued the first issuance and some 
problems emerged, but until the second issuance the situation is Zinkia was not that 
difficult. While the regulator published a harsh statement against the company, the 
issuance became public, all of this in a time when production problems were far from 
being solved with the issuance. Days later, the company canceled the issuance and 
entered bankruptcy. This case has not been the only one striking in the AIM: The case 
of Gowex, a company that proved to be a fraud, which had made millions euros of 
profit in two capital increases, thus tricking minority shareholders, is also known. 
Therefore, we should reflect on the supervisory chain fails in these cases, and  the 
20 
 
audit processes carried out. Surely we must highlight the importance of them to prevent 
new cases in which small investors may be scammed. 
In the latter period, we only have at our disposal the annual accounts for 2014, 
following the trend set by the previous years. 2015 can be understood it as a transition 
year for Zinkia. Being within bankruptcy, the company reached the most important 
milestone in this year, which was reaching an agreement with creditors to get out of the 
contest and resuming the activity again, which gives the company some hope thanks to 
refinancing debt both to ten and to twenty years. Undoubtedly, it gives Zinkia room for 
manoeuvre, which until now it had not had. 
5.3 Financial Analysis of Zinkia in 2014 
 
Table 6 
  2014 
Shareholders equity 5.130.485 22,85 % 
Profit before taxes -4.612.928 
 
Current liabilities 11.973.940 53,34 % 
 
If we analyze the data showing the annual accounts of the company, we can quickly 
get an idea of its difficult situation. The result for the year 2014 is the worst of all in the 
historical series discussed in this document, with losses of more than 4.6 million euros. 
It was certainly a blow, which resulted also of the competition situation in which the 
company was. If we review the income statement, we see that the item other operating 
expenses, in which primarily impairments and professional services are included, 
already exceeds sales reporting year. This steady drip of negative results is reflected in 
the balance of society in a very striking way. Equity decreases from 9 million in 2013, 
up just over 5 in 2014. This decrease, along with the increase of 3.5 million euros in 
short-term debt, implies that current liabilities take more importance than the equity of 
the company. If in the previous section we indicated that it was recommended that the 
short-term debt did not exceed half the value of the net assets of the company, now we 
realize the weight the debt problem acquires in Zinkia during this period. 
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Graphic 2 
  
 
The main ratio in which the CNMV based to warn of the delicate situation of Zinkia in 
the statement attached to the 2013 bond issue was the working capital. The working 
capital is calculated by the following formula. 
Working capital = Current assets − Current liabilities. 
Using this ratio, we see very quickly if the company has sufficient liquid assets to meet 
debt falling due in the short term. As shown in the graph, working capital perfectly 
illustrates the evolution of Zinkia in the years analyzed. Based on a good result in 2009, 
working capital becomes negative in the years 2011 and 2012, and it chillingly falls in 
2013 and 2014 due to the maturity of the bonds issued in 2010. This graph also shows 
the need Zinkia has during the years 2014 and 2015 to renegotiate its short-term debt 
with the creditors, as it is clearly unsustainable for the company. Current liabilities rise 
to 12 million euros in 2014, a debt too large for a company like Zinkia. This situation 
has improved with the favorable result of the agreement in the bankruptcy, because the 
debt has been refinanced to 10 and 20 years. However, the company still has a long 
way to go to the problem that has accompanied it since 2010.  
Other ratios that reveal the difficult situation of Zinkia are ROE and ROA. The financial 
profitability ratio shows a value of −92.33 %, while ROA is also shown in negative, with 
a value of −16.85 %. The company solved as well as it could the problem of debt by 
refinancing it, but it must show from the current year that it deserves the confidence of 
creditors and that its business is strong enough so that the result of the financial year 
begins to be positive. With the sole exception of 2012, the results have been negative, 
so it seems obvious that an improvement in the management of the company is 
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necessary. Even in times when the company got funding, for example in 2009 and 
2010, its results were negative. Despite the debt refinancing, Zinkia urgently needs to 
reverse its situation, because otherwise previous efforts would have been for nothing, 
both the company’s and creditors’. 
The current situation of the company has still a high degree of uncertainty due to the 
struggle for power in it. The current president, Jose María Castillejo, keeps trying, 
through judicial resources, to maintain its majority stake. The owner of Jomaca 98, a 
company which has its assets in auction, attempts to delay the execution of a loan 
guarantee, owned by Miguel Valladares, who nowadays owns 11 % of the company. At 
the time when Valladares executes these guarantees, among which 33 % of the shares 
of Zinkia are included, Castillejo will no longer be the largest shareholder of the 
producer, leaving his post to the Mexican entrepreneur. Despite these disputes, the 
company continues its course, and it has scheduled landing this year in the children's 
channel of state television of China (elEconomista 2016). It can be seen as a step in 
the right direction, of the many that the firm still has to carry out in order to reverse its 
current delicate situation. We should pay attention to how the situation evolves, as 
there are many interests at stake, especially those of small investors who have fallen 
into this delicate situation, and who certainly expect a favorable solution. 
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6. Criticisms towards the AIM from the perspective of Zinkia’s experience 
 
One of the interesting points in the history of Zinkia is, undoubtedly, its relationship with 
the AIM: why a relatively small company decides to access a stock market and why it 
chooses the AIM instead of other markets available; what advantages has the AIM 
compared to more traditional stock markets, and if those benefits obtained by the 
company are detrimental to investors. 
Within the AIM, Zinkia joined, and released, a forum for recruitment for growing 
businesses (hereinafter AIM-EE), a segment within AIM which serves the general 
function of the stock markets, allowing more liquid possible exchange of the assets 
traded. What makes it special is that its structure and activity have adapted to the 
demands and possibilities of small capitalization companies. And for that, the AIM-EE 
had to be categorized as a multilateral trading facility (MTF), which, in the current 
legislation of the Securities Market Act (SMA), excludes it from the regulatory siege 
imposed to official secondary markets (Castilla 2009). The flexibility of the AIM-EE was 
reached by paying the price of not enjoying recognition of being a "regulated market" 
under Community Law. This flexibility and the exclusion of the regulatory fence, refers 
to various points on the standards that are met by the companies listed on official 
markets. 
As it falls outside the laws of the Securities Market Act in several respects, it is the AIM 
itself that regulates itself in many ways, and it does it in a looser way. One of the most 
important ones is not having the obligation to develop the prospectus that marks the 
SMA in the event of a public offering of securities and trading. In return, companies in 
the AIM-EE should develop an "initial information document", which is much less 
demanding than the previous one, both regarding the quantity and quality of 
information and the production costs. Other striking features are that there is no need 
for sufficient distribution of shares, that a minimum capitalization of only 2 million euros 
—in front of 6 million euros in traditional stock markets— is needed, and that the 
companies do not need to have made profits in previous years. Certainly these are 
much more flexible requirements, which allow companies to reach them more easily. 
Especially important are the differences in the information provided during their stay in 
the stock market. Companies in the AIM-EE do not need to provide quarterly 
information, nor are they required to prepare their accounts in full, i.e., they can be 
developed in an abbreviated form. They do not need to provide an annual report on 
corporate governance, or form a compulsory audit committee, among other issues. 
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This lack of reporting obligations can only have one individual wronged: the end 
investor, who is the one who usually demands this type of information to make his or 
her own investment decisions. 
One aspect to think about regarding these markets, and in particular with regard to the 
present case, the AIM-EE, is the concept we have about them from an outside view. As 
they are open to the public stock market, we can think that it is a market regulated the 
same way than traditional markets do, when in reality it is not. This is indeed a 
problem, as many investors can access to this market believing that it meets some 
requirements that are not met in reality. It is, therefore, the CNMV work to carry out a 
good information job, in which the end investor knows the differences between 
regulated markets and this "unofficial" market. Thus, the investor will be able to 
evaluate all options and direct its resources to those places where they feel really 
comfortable. This way, they will possibly avoid controversial situations in which 
misinformation can lead to additional problems in cases of fraud. 
The way in which the AIM-EE aims to strengthen its perception of being an organized 
and regulated market is through the figure of "registered counselor": an adviser which 
accompanies the company since it shows its first intention to join the market, advising it 
to meet the requirements of entry and stay. In addition, this adviser must inform the 
market if the company he or she advises does not meet the minimum requirements. 
However, this is not a figure without a great degree of uncertainty, since he or she 
accompanies the same entity throughout its life at the AIM-EE, and he or she must, at 
the same time, report the offences the aforementioned company could have commit. It 
is a situation that can sometimes be strange, and it is important that the market 
develops strong internal controls over advisers themselves. In particular, in Zinkia this 
problem was reflected in the second attempt to issue bonds. The CNMV, in the 
statement we have already mentioned, questioned the work carried out by the 
independent expert. 
Certainly, it is a situation we should reflect about after we have get to know some 
cases of fraud, such as Gowex’s, or some cases such as the one under study. We 
should wonder why an entity that has a couple of years with losses in its results can 
access a market like this, especially after carrying out a capital increase, and a year 
later it can issue public debt accessible to any type of investor, especially when the 
information provided by this market is not as demanding as in traditional markets and 
potential investors can ignore the "unofficial" features of this market. It seems positive 
that the CNMV carries out an informative work, where the differences between these 
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markets and the regulated ones are clears, and a greater control work, both on 
companies in the market and on registered accompanying advisors. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Throughout this document, we have been telling the story of Zinkia, with particular 
emphasis on analyzing its results and narrating its search for funding for new projects 
and, later, for solving its problems in the short term. Seeking funding to boost new 
projects is a good idea. However, Zinkia problems began to appear when the financing 
had to be directed, mainly, to solve the problems in the form of short-term debt. The 
company could not obtain all the resources required by the stock market debut, and 
from this moment the situation went from bad to worse. Certain projects are abandoned 
and the audiovisual producer has to resort to a second formula due to the poor 
performance of previous years. Undoubtedly, it is the beginning of a vicious circle, 
which will be exacerbated by the bad results that are still happening the remaining 
years. 
As we have discussed in the last section, we must reflect on why the company came to 
this situation, and what responsibility has a market like AIM in this case. Undoubtedly, 
a market with laxer conditions, that is accessible to small and medium enterprises, is 
good news for the economy. However, these lax conditions should have a certain limit 
in order to try to avoid as far as possible a case like Zinkia’s. We must bear in mind that 
these markets can be accessed by all types of investors, and perhaps some do not 
know what exactly a market like AIM is: a market that, under current legislation, is 
outside the "regulated markets". That is why it seems prudent that the CNMV provides 
better information for all investors. We should not forget that a company like Zinkia, 
which debuts in the AIM after a couple of periods in losses, is able to launch a capital 
increase on a stock exchange and, subsequently, issue debt aimed at all types of 
investors. 
Beyond all these problems, the best news for Zinkia is that today it still exists. Few 
companies with debt levels as we have seen in this document have managed to 
survive a bankruptcy. Zinkia did it thanks to the projection of its flagship product, 
Pocoyó. There is still, however, a long way to go, because the debt is stretched today 
to 10 or 20 years ahead. The results of the company should improve a lot for it to 
survive to its debt. In order to do this, several positive aspects should converge, which 
so far has not happened. Among them, an improvement in the management of the 
company and stability within it is particularly important. Despite poor results in previous 
years, it seems that today the first scenario is more feasible than the second. We well 
take a look of the development of society in the coming months, since despite having 
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good news as the landing in China, today has more problems to solve than good news 
to give to all those creditors who hope that Zinkia finally finds the good path. 
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